

Investigating Windows systems with Linux

# WINDOW KIT

A forensics expert explains how to extract interesting details from a confiscated Windows hard disk using standard Linux tools. **BY HANS-PETER MERKEL AND MARKUS FEILNER**

**C**riminals, intruders, and corporate saboteurs leave data behind on the hard disks of any computers they visit. Many of these computers are Windows systems, but you don't need Windows to extract valuable forensic information from a Windows hard disk. In this article, I will describe some simple techniques for getting forensic data from a Windows disk using Linux.

Before starting any forensic analysis, it is important to create a copy of the storage medium you will be investigating, either as a 1:1 copy or as an image or collection of images. You can copy the medium as a raw image (with *dd*) or use a format such as Expert Witness Format (EWF).


EWF is a proprietary format developed by Guidance Software [1] that is also supported by the X-Ways [2] commercial forensic tool. EWF images are compressed and thus are far smaller than raw images.

Linux tools such as Linux Encase (Linen) or Ewfacquire [3] will help you

create an EWF image. Linen is included on the Helix forensics CD [4] as a free contribution by Guidance Software, but the *dd* tool, which is included on any Linux distribution, will normally do the trick. If you use *dd*, you can even launch a copy of the Windows system in a vir-

tual environment such as VMware; EWF will not let you launch Windows without the proprietary add-on software because of its compressed format.

A command such as *dd if=/dev/sda of=win\_hd.dd bs=4096 conv=noerror, sync* will create a *dd* image. Instead of



```

Shell - Konsole
Session Edit View Bookmarks Settings Help
3aefa1c534d80696705e00058b1075e4 /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/rdpdr.sys
f6ccf6655d5ae345d0f9fa1aa10e8af8 /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/rdpwd.sys
a83295e9f4a5595b22bcf099b226e919 /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/rdpwsx.dll
64324372b5e40ff63d0d09137affa55f /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/recover.exe
1c3a3358ae96408a268e63846e099ee7 /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/redbook.sys
3a765fcd074c2ac8a3d74568bce2afb /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/regapi.dll
36a133a04d05fccc2711f0344990cd8 /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/regedit.exe
ce72869deccc80a6a9621d68e7250383 /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/regedt32.exe
973a97bb48b5b39e7567b6f88c03005e /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/regsvcs.exe
b5f69b14db2bc85fba055ed6ed381f8 /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/regsvr32.exe
2515a821e203eafa34aca05858bbad4a /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/rend.dll
d01784b9ad9665453a45ad5c1017f24e /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/resutils.dll
1a6cfe1b7084cb761427e63597724438 /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/riched20.dll
aa41c6c3085a4339c5976e3b09825494 /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/msdxm.ocx
c5da1a7860aec9a2c369337acded7fe7 /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/msdxm.dll
a9b59188f0256dfaad2127a1c7d47965 /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/msexch40.dll
99c7a814d9c16c1e99c806583902fb52 /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/msxcl40.dll
5022e14956d8447959dc90e58d060688 /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/msg.exe
7572b1ee3652cd79bcbeeda03d81be4e /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/msgina.dll
6667d07854a3ae7715d22b82761cf0e7 /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/msgspc.sys
73d9a54e33a9dcf23aa48a367bcb4e24 /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/msgsvc.dll
69f2594dafb0b946740022d49ecb5f91 /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/mshdc.inf
48315f8452a7db59a56aca28541eab92 /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/mshata.exe
f59a23e61fc06f1d64f7b82caf13be9b /mnt/wINNT/ServicePackFiles/i386/mshhtml.dll
  
```

**Figure 1: Md5sum can create unique hashes for the files on a Windows filesystem. You can compare the values in the first column with the hash values for known files.**

*/dev/sda*, just specify the disk you want to copy. The block size *bs = 4096* accelerates the copy. The *conv* parameter ensures that the copy will not terminate if it encounters defective sectors.

By entering *fdisk -lu*, you can obtain information on the disk image. The administrator simply needs to pass in the image name (Listing 1).

In Listing 1, the image contains a partition; the filesystem is NTFS. The *disktype* program from the standard Debian repositories provides more information (Listing 2). The partition obviously contains the Windows bootloader.

To access the filesystem, the administrator first needs to mount it. The partition starts with sector 63, which is normal for a hard disk. The exception to this is Microsoft's latest offspring, Windows Vista, in which the first sector is 2047. The *mount* command thus specifies the matching offset:

```
# losetup -o $((63*512)) ↵
/dev/loop0 U win_hd.dd
# mount -o ro,noatime,noexec ↵
/dev/loop0 /mnt
```

A quick glance at */mnt* reveals the startup files and filesystem of a Windows drive. A quick glance at the *boot.ini* file reveals that they belong to a Windows 2000 Server (Listing 3).

## Seeking with Find

Criminal investigators often use the Linux *find* command with the *--exec* or *xargs xx* options to search for files with illegal content. After creating and mounting an image, *find /mnt -type f* will give you a detailed list of files. Because this approach does not take file names with blanks or non-standard characters into account, the investigator might opt for *find /mnt -type f -print0 | xargs -0 ls -al*.

Hash values help find identical and suspicious files on a system. You can create a hash automatically with a command such as *find /mnt -type f -print0 | xargs -0 md5sum*; you can even compare the hashes on the fly with existing reference material. However, it makes more sense to create a file containing hashes for all files (Figure 1).

## Hashes Find Duplicates

In most cases, investigators already have

hashes for files they want to find. Forensics experts compile databases with hashes of known files to help search for criminal material. If you just want to filter out Microsoft DLLs on a system you are investigating, this approach is useful.

A simple *grep* command will find any correlations between the subject of the investigation and your search targets.

The following command, from which we have removed the individual filenames, saves a list of hashes for existing files in a file called *big.txt*:

```
# find /mnt -type f -print0 | ↵
xargs -0 md5sum | awk ↵
'{print $1}' | sort -g | ↵
uniq > big.txt
```

### Listing 1: Getting Information with fdisk

```
01 # fdisk -lu win_hd.dd
02 Disk win_hd.dd: 0 MB, 0 bytes
03 120 heads, 63 sectors/track, 0 cylinders, total 0 sectorsUnits =
   sectors of 1 * 512 = 512 bytes
04 Disk identifier: 0x840b840b
05 Device      Boot      Start      End      Blocks      Id
   System
06 win_hd.dd1  *          63         6327719163828+    7
   HPFS/NTFS
```

### Listing 2: Disktype Data

```
01 # disktype win_hd.dd
02 --- win_hd.dd
03 Regular file, size 3.021 GiB (3243663360 bytes)
04 DOS/MBR partition map
05 Partition 1: 3.017 GiB (3239760384 bytes, 6327657 sectors from 63,
   bootable)
06 Type 0x07 (HPFS/NTFS)
07 Windows NTLDR boot loader
08 NTFS file system
09 Volume size 3.017 GiB (3239759872 bytes, 6327656 sectors)
```

### Listing 3: Windows Filesystem

```
01 # ls -l /mnt
02 Total 787024
03 -r----- 1 root root 150528 2003-06-19 13:05 arcldr.exe
04 -r----- 1 root root 163840 2003-06-19 13:05 arcsetup.exe
05 -r----- 1 root root 0 2007-12-02 11:59 AUTOEXEC.BAT
06 -r----- 1 root root 186 2007-12-02 11:43 boot.ini
07 -r----- 1 root root 0 2007-12-02 11:59 CONFIG.SYS
08 dr-x----- 1 root root 4096 2007-12-02 14:14 Dokumente und
   Einstellungen
09 dr-x----- 1 root root 24576 2007-12-02 14:14 WINNT
10 (...)
11 # cat /mnt/boot.ini
12 [boot loader]
13 timeout=30
14 default=multi(0)disk(0)rdisk(0)partition(1)\ WINNT
15 [operating systems]
16 multi(0)disk(0)rdisk(0)partition(1)\WINNT="Microsoft Windows 2000
   Server" /fastdetect
17 (...)
```



stamp information (Listing 5). If you want a neatly grouped view with a timeline of the events, you can run *mactime -b /tmp/body*. To tell the tool to look for keywords in the deleted files on an NTFS partition:

```
# dls /dev/loop0 > unallocated
# cat unallocated | strings | >
egrep -i --color -f keywords.txt
```

The *dls* command converts the unallocated space into a file, which *cat* then pipes to *strings* and *egrep*.

## File Slack

File slack [7] refers to data in the unused space on a filesystem. This effect occurs when you save, for example, a 2KB file on a filesystem with 4KB blocks. All popular Windows systems just pad the unused space with random data from RAM to fill up the blocks.

Tools such as *dls* from The Sleuth Kit, or *bmap* [8], let an investigator recreate

data that the user sometimes didn't even knowingly store on their disk. Some investigators have used this approach to reconstruct incriminating emails.

*dls* with the *-s* option is particularly useful for this purpose:

```
# dls -s /dev/loop0 > fileslack
# cat fileslack | >
strings | egrep >
-i U--color -f keywords.txt
```

This gives the forensics expert the ability to search the file slack for keywords. According to a study [9], modern Linux filesystems are not affected by this problem; they pad the unused bytes with harmless zeros courtesy of */dev/zero*.

## Restore Deleted Files

*ntfsundelete*, from the *ntfsprogs* package, gives any Linux admin the ability to restore deleted files on NTFS partitions. Before you run *ntfsundelete*, you first need to release the */dev/loop0* device, typically by issuing a *umount /mnt*.

## THE AUTHOR

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Without specifying any additional options, *ntfsundelete /dev/loop0* just outputs a list of all undeletable files (Figure 3). The example in Figure 3 undeletes the *msiinst.exe* file on inode 11137.

Files existing on the hard disk could provide much user information. Both Microsoft's Internet Explorer and Firefox store their history on the filesystem. The investigator needs to install two programs to analyze the information:

- Pasco [10] for Internet Explorer
  - Mork.pl [11] for Mozilla Firefox
- Listing 6 shows a typical analysis se-

## Listing 6: Browser History

```
01 # mount -o ro,noatime,noexec /dev/loop0 /mnt
02 # find /mnt -iname "index.dat" -exec pasco '{} ' ';
03 TYPE      URL          MODIFIED TIME  ACCESS TIME    FILENAME        DIRECTORY      HTTP HEADERS
04 URL       http://www.google.de/favicon.ico      06/07/2006 21:35:34  12/02/2007
05 12:14:28   favicon[1].ico  NGORCTFI      HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: image/x-icon
06 Content-Length: 1406 ~U:administrator
07 REDR     http://msn.iwbox.de/cgi-bin/iwv/CP/MSNO1000000;?r=
08         12/02/2007 12:11:32    12/02/2007 12:11:32
09 URL      Visited: Administrator@http://www.google.de    12/02/2007 12:14:28
10 URL      Visited: Administrator@http://www.msn.de        12/02/2007 14:33:54    12/02/2007
11 14:33:54
12 # find /mnt -iname "history.dat" -exec mork.pl '{} ' ';
13 1202727704    1    http://www.linux4afrika.de/index.php?id=155&L=1
14 1202727670    1    http://www.linux4afrika.de/index.php?id=154&L=1
15 1202727641    1    http://www.linux4afrika.de/index.php?id=60&L=1
16 1202727641    2    http://www.linux4afrika.de/
17 1202727555    1    http://n-tv.de/916916.html
18 1202726960    1    http://n-tv.de/916917.html
19 1202726892    1    http://n-tv.de/916908.html
20 1202726827    3    http://n-tv.de/
21 1202726394    2    http://www.linux-magazine.com/
22 1202726204    2    http://www.google.de/
23 # find /mnt -iname "history.dat" -exec mork.pl '{} ' ';' | awk '{print strftime("%F,%R", $1), $2, $3}'
24 2008-02-11 11:40 1 http://www.linux-magazin.com/heft_abo/ausgaben/2008/03/zwerg_am_druecker
25 2008-02-11 11:39 2 http://www.linux-magazine.com/
26 2008-02-11 11:36 2 http://www.google.com/
27 (...)
```

quence: Internet Explorer stores information for each profile in files titled *index.dat*. Running a *find* command against the file gives the investigator a list of the pages accessed in the browser.

## Revealing Mozilla

Firefox stores its data in *history.dat*. The first column contains the date and time information in Unix timestamp format. The third command in Listing 6 converts this to a human-compatible format. *Dumphive* [12] provides an approach to making the registry on a Windows system more easily readable (Figure 4). The *dumphive /mnt/WINNT/system32/config/system system.txt* command stores the registry in a separate text file, which

the investigator can probe using Unix text tools.

## Windows Passwords

Access to the system is interesting in its own right, but discovering the user's passwords often opens up other vectors to the investigators, as most users don't bother changing their passwords when they log in to various websites and services. On top of this, passwords give the forensics investigator the ability to log in to a virtualized image system on VMWare and to investigate various system logs and files.

In addition to employing brute force attacks and tools like John the Ripper, which use dictionaries or rainbow ta-

bles, the Linux admin can turn to other tools such as Bkhive, Samdump2, and Ophcrack [13].

Extracting local passwords from a SAM file is not hard, as used by Windows NT-based operating systems, especially if you combine various tools. For example, John the Ripper automatically detects a Windows SAM file if you feed it to the tool. The Microsoft-specific password genus is useful here: Although Windows credentials can be up to 14 characters, the system splits them into two strings of seven characters each. This is a useful contribution by the manufacturer that makes it easier for investigators to break passwords without extreme number crunching.

As of Windows Vista, Microsoft closed this gap and replaced the Lanmanager hashes with NT hashes. XP admins can set this up manually; investigators on Linux have to run *dumphive* to check whether the Registry contains an entry

| Inode | File Name | Size | Date       | Type                 |
|-------|-----------|------|------------|----------------------|
| 11123 | FN..      | 14%  | 2003-06-19 | 305664 msihnd.dll    |
| 11124 | FN..      | 46%  | 2003-06-19 | 50688 msiinst.exe    |
| 11125 | FN..      | 33%  | 2003-06-19 | 182198 msimain.sdb   |
| 11126 | FN..      | 5%   | 2003-06-19 | 847872 msimg.dll     |
| 11127 | FN..      | 30%  | 2003-06-19 | 39936 msisip.dll     |
| 11128 | FN..      | 77%  | 2003-06-19 | 72192 sdbapiu.dll    |
| 11130 | D...      | 0%   | 2007-12-02 | 0 InstMsi0           |
| 11131 | FN..      | 0%   | 2003-06-19 | 951808 instmsi.msi   |
| 11132 | FN..      | 66%  | 2003-06-19 | 8337 msi.cat         |
| 11133 | FN..      | 4%   | 2003-06-19 | 2017792 msi.dll      |
| 11134 | FN..      | 0%   | 2003-06-19 | 1119 msi.inf         |
| 11135 | FN..      | 0%   | 2003-06-19 | 64512 mslexec.exe    |
| 11136 | FN..      | 0%   | 2003-06-19 | 305664 msihnd.dll    |
| 11137 | FN..      | 100% | 2003-06-19 | 50688 msiinst.exe    |
| 11138 | FN..      | 100% | 2003-06-19 | 182198 msimain.sdb   |
| 11139 | FN..      | 0%   | 2003-06-19 | 847872 msimg.dll     |
| 11140 | FN..      | 100% | 2003-06-19 | 39936 msisip.dll     |
| 11141 | FN..      | 11%  | 2003-06-19 | 72192 sdbapiu.dll    |
| 11900 | FN..      | 23%  | 2007-12-02 | 989773 CIM.REC.BAK   |
| 11901 | FR..      | 100% | 2007-12-02 | 12 \$WinMgmt.CFG.BAK |
| 11902 | FR..      | 100% | 2007-12-02 | 12 \$WinMgmt.CFG.BAK |
| 11903 | FR..      | 100% | 2007-12-02 | 259 spupdsvc.inf     |

Figure 3: Ntfsundelete shows deleted files that can be undeleted. The first column contains the inode number required to restore the file on the filesystem in the image file.

```
[system\ControlSet002\Services\{51F3E9E7-E431-4B38-8F61-6DE931F037B1}]
[system\ControlSet002\Services\{51F3E9E7-E431-4B38-8F61-6DE931F037B1}\Parameters]
[system\ControlSet002\Services\{51F3E9E7-E431-4B38-8F61-6DE931F037B1}\Parameters\Tcpip]
*EnabledHCP=dword:00000001
*IPAddress*=hex(7):30,2e,30,2e,30,2e,30,00,00
*SubnetMask*=hex(7):30,2e,30,2e,30,2e,30,00,00
*DefaultGateway*=hex(7):00
*DhcpIPAddress*=192.168.0.129
*DhcpSubnetMask*=255.255.255.0
*DhcpServer*=192.168.0.2
*Lease*=dword:0000a8c0
*LeaseObtainedTime*=dword:4752c36c
*T1*=dword:475317cc
*T2*=dword:47535714
*LeaseTerminatesTime*=dword:47536c2c
*DhcpDefaultGateway*=hex(7):31,39,32,2e,31,36,38,2e,30,2e,31,00,00
*DhcpSubnetMaskOpt*=hex(7):32,35,35,2e,32,35,35,2e,32,35,35,2e,30,00,00

[system\MountedDevices]
*\\??\Volume{59686d20-a0c8-11dc-8c45-806d6172696f}*="hex:5c,00,3f,00,3f,00,5c,\
00,46,00,44,00,43,00,23,00,47,00,45,00,4e,00,45,00,52,00,49,00,43,00,5f,00,\
46,00,4c,00,4f,00,50,00,50,00,59,00,5f,00,44,00,52,00,49,00,56,00,45,00,23,\
00,35,00,26,00,31,00,33,00,35,00,35,00,38,00,63,00,62,00,61,00,26,00,30,00,\
26,00,30,00,23,00,7b,00,35,00,33,00,66,00,35,00,36,00,33,00,30,00,64,00,2d,\
00,62,00,36,00,62,00,66,00,2d,00,31,00,31,00,64,00,30,00,2d,00,39,00,34,00,\
66,00,32,00,2d,00,30,00,30,00,61,00,30,00,63,00,39,00,31,00,65,00,66,00,62,\
00,38,00,62,00,7d,00
*\\??\Volume{59686d21-a0c8-11dc-8c45-806d6172696f}*="hex:5c,00,3f,00,3f,00,5c,\
00,49,00,44,00,45,00,23,00,43,00,64,00,52,00,6f,00,6d,00,43,00,4f,00,4d,00,\
```

Figure 4: *Dumphive* converts the Windows Registry to cleartext. Search tools such as *grep* can then help you reconstruct critical settings, for example, the password hash or IP data.

## INFO

- [1] Guidance Software: <http://www.guidancesoftware.com>
- [2] X-Ways: <http://www.x-ways.net/corporate/index-m.html>
- [3] Ewfacquire: <https://www.uitwisselplatform.nl/projects/libewf>
- [4] Helix: <http://www.e-fense.com/helix>
- [5] Endianness: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Endianness>
- [6] The Sleuth Kit: <http://sleuthkit.org>
- [7] Wikipedia on file slack: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File-Slack>
- [8] bmap: <http://www.packetstormsecurity.org/linux/security/bmap-1.0.17.tar.gz>
- [9] File slack analysis on Linux: <http://www.woerter.at/dud/stuff/fileslack.pdf>
- [10] Pasco download: [http://downloads.sourceforge.net/odessa/pasco\\_20040505\\_1.tar.gz?modtime=1083715200&big\\_mirror=0](http://downloads.sourceforge.net/odessa/pasco_20040505_1.tar.gz?modtime=1083715200&big_mirror=0)
- [11] Mork.pl: <http://www.jwz.org/hacks/mork.pl>
- [12] *Dumphive*: [http://v4.guadalinex.org/guadalinex-toro/pool/main/d/dumphive/dumphive\\_0.0.3-1\\_i386.deb](http://v4.guadalinex.org/guadalinex-toro/pool/main/d/dumphive/dumphive_0.0.3-1_i386.deb)
- [13] Ophcrack and Ophcrack Live CD: <http://ophcrack.sourceforge.net>
- [14] Foundstone Forensic Tools: <http://www.foundstone.com/us/resources-free-tools.asp>

that sets `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/SYSTEM/CurrentControl-Set/Control/Lsa` to 1. If so, your only option might be to open your wallet and buy an 8.5GB dual-layer DVD with commercial LM or NT Rainbow Tables.

Like the other tools referred to in this article, Ophcrack is included in the Debian repositories. The Ophcrack utility requires rainbow tables and the hashes from the Windows machine. After completing the install, the investigator can work conveniently with the GUI and just double-click to decipher a user's password (Figure 5).

### Domain Controllers

A different approach is required for Windows systems that log in to domain controllers; in this case, the credentials are not stored locally on the client. However, in many cases it is sufficient to run a network sniffer to capture the login exchange, identify the relevant data packets, save them to a file, and then feed a dump to Ophcrack. Of course, this is more complex, and you do need live access to the network.

### Comparatively Simple

With the addition of a couple of extra packages, the Windows world is wide open to an investigator running Linux. If you need more of this good thing, take a look at the free forensic tools by Foundstone [14]. These tools give investigators the ability to restore cookies, long-gone entries from the Windows trash can, and many other things.

Experienced Linux users might find the shell approach refreshing, but some users will prefer to avoid the complex command-line syntax. The learning curve for Linux newcomers will likely be steeper for open source tools compared with more expensive commercial products. The winner in the usability stakes has to be the fully automated Ophcrack Live CD, which removes the need for users to type pesky shell commands and displays the local user's Windows passwords shortly after booting.

When we tested this on an XP system (SP2), the CD took just 280 seconds to discover the credentials of the five user accounts (which included up to 14 characters; see Figure 5). The live Linux version on the CD includes just the tables for alphanumeric passwords without non-standard characters. If you want more, you will have to invest in the commercial Rainbow Tables. ■

| ID   | USERNAME/LMHASH | LMpasswd1       | LMpasswd2 | NTpasswd       |
|------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------|----------------|
| 500  | Administrator   | /EMPTY/         |           | /EMPTY/        |
| 501  | Gast            | /EMPTY/         |           | /EMPTY/        |
| 1000 | Hilfeassistent  |                 | 80TMBSZ   |                |
| 1006 | test1           | AS2C4S          |           | aS2C4s         |
| 1007 | test2           | DF9TPIZ         |           | dF9tPiZ        |
| 1008 | test3           | VCWYWW1 P       |           | vCwYww1P       |
| 1009 | test4           | 341BPFC VY      |           | 341bPfcVy      |
| 1010 | testsz (ue)     | ASQ128V X324ASQ |           | asQ128vX324aSq |
| 1011 | test5           | BNLOP9D DDX     |           | bnLoP9ddDx     |

Table set: LM alphanumeric | Tables in use: 4 to 4 : 7% | Passwords: 8/9 | Time elapsed: 740...

Figure 5: Double-click to crack a Windows user's password. An automated Live CD is also available.

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