

Looking for intruders with Isof

QUICK CHECK

Track down and expose intruders with the versatile admin tool Isof.

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Has your server been cracked? Are your processes running wild? If you suspect an intrusion, you'll need accurate information on what's happening with the system. Open file handles are a useful source for this information. Isof [1] scans the depths of the filesystem for these files and then returns comprehensive and detailed output.

To be fully prepared for an attack, you'll need an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) like Snort, Tripwire or Aide to check the filesystem and data streams for suspicious patterns. However, if you don't have the time or resources for a full-blown intrusion response, Linux has a number of standard command line programs capable of discovering tell-tale traces on a system. The usual suspects for server diagnosis are *ps*, *netstat*, *top*, *fuser*, and other friendly helpers.

Isof is a single tool that provides a summary of similar system information. You can use Isof as a single source for

obtaining information that would otherwise require a whole collection of admin utilities.

As the adage goes, "everything is a file" in Unix. Almost all activities on a Unix-like system bear some relation to an open file. Unix-style systems use regular files, special block files, executables, libraries, directories, internal data streams (Unix Domain Sockets), and network connections. Isof is able to centrally collect and synthesize all this information into meaningful clues about the nature of an attack.

Like any utility, Isof is subject to manipulation once the attacker

has gotten comfortable. If you are serious about using Isof for intrusion detection, leave out the *make install* step after compiling and manually move the binary to a write-protected medium such as a CD ROM. Of course, if a sophisticated attacker has directly modified the kernel (through a kernel rootkit, for ex-



Figure 1: The promising gISO tool gives GUI fans easy access to filter settings.

ample) the output of Isuf will be unreliable even if the tool itself is untouched. However, as you'll learn in this article, many attackers try tricks that *aren't* especially sophisticated and are easily exposed with a tool like Isuf.

Isuf is no substitute for a full-featured IDS, but if you are too late for that or if you aren't interested in implementing or managing a more comprehensive system, you can still use Isuf to look for footprints.

Investigations

Table 1 lists a number of examples for investigating a system. If you enable Isuf's security option, only root will receive detailed output for these commands. In secure mode, Isuf will only show users the details that directly affect them, however, even in insecure mode, Isuf gives users without root privileges fewer details, as you need root privileges to access the details in */proc*.

Isuf uses a tabular format to output the information filtered as specified by the parameter list, including the following columns by default:

- Process name: *COMMAND*
- Process ID: *PID*
- Name of system user account under which the process is running: *USER*
- File descriptor: *FD*
- File type: *TYPE*
- Device: *DEVICE*
- Size: *SIZE*
- Connection: *NODE*
- Full name: *NAME*

Listing 1: Compiling Isuf

```
01 wget ftp://lsuf.itap.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/lsuf/lsuf.tar.bz2
02 tar xjf lsuf.tar.bz2
03 cd lsuf_4.77
04 wget ftp://lsuf.itap.purdue.edu/pub/Victor_A_Abell.gpg
05 gpg --import Victor_A_Abell.gpg
06 gpg --verify lsuf_4.77_src.tar.sig lsuf_4.77_src.tar
07 tar xf lsuf_4.77_src.tar
08 cd lsuf_4.77_src
09 ./Configure linux
10 make -s
11 ./lsuf -v
```

You can manipulate the output for processing with other tools using *lsuf -F*. Special formatting helps the downstream tools parse the individual fields (see the manpage section *Output for other programs* for details).

Flood of Information

Calling Isuf without setting parameters returns too much information to provide a useful overview – the flood of information would scare off many users. However, command line parameters can help Isuf concentrate on the data you need. If you combine multiple parameters, Isuf assumes a logical OR operation by default; however, you can specify *-a* for an AND operation (last line in Table 1).

Identifying processes that are preventing users from unmounting a storage medium is a typical task for Isuf. Calling Isuf with the *-t directoryname* option returns a list of numeric process IDs accessing the CD-ROM:

```
$ umount /dev/cdrom
umount: /cdrom: device is busy
$ kill -9 `lsuf -t /dev/cdrom`
$ umount /dev/cdrom
$ eject
```

Finding and Building Isuf

Isuf supports a number of Unix derivatives, and it is probably part of your basic Linux system, or at least it should reside in the standard repository. To install on Debian, for example, you just need to issue a *apt-get install Isuf* command. The lean package has no dependencies, apart from the mandatory Libc 6.

This said, there are two reasons for avoiding the prebuilt binary: system compatibility and security. As Isuf's developer Vic Abel points out in the FAQ [2], you can only guarantee a full feature set and optimum stability, if you build the current Isuf version on the target machine, since Isuf digs deep into the system architecture and kernel. It is always better to obtain tools you will be using for preventive or forensic analysis from a safe source and not to mix them with standard system tools to avoid the danger of manipulation by rootkits.

The Isuf sources are easily compiled, so you might as well build a version that matches your system. The commands in Listing 1 grab the sources of the network; use GnuPG to check the signature (note that the key in our example was




Figure 2: The Jlsuf filter dialog tells you the correct Isuf parameters. Although this might confuse GUI-only users, it does make it easier for users to move to the command line.

However, this method is as drastic as it is effective.

Expectations

The commands listed in Table 1 are fine for discovering important facts about a system before or after an attack. To defend yourself against invaders, you need to be familiar with the normal status, and to be aware of where suspicious entries are likely to appear.

The following example uses a traditional LAMP system (Linux, Apache,

obtained from an insecure source), configure the source code, and compile it. During the configuration phase, you are prompted to make a few decisions. The *HASSECURITY* and *HASNOSOCKSECURITY* options are important. If you would only like the root user to be able to use Isuf to list open files and sockets for all users, you need to answer [y] and [n]. The inconsistent terminology does tend to be confusing.

On completing the build, *./lsuf -v* tells you the options it was compiled with. The *Only root can list all files* message means that normal users will be unable to misuse the program to list system-critical information. (Restricting access to Isuf is a rather cosmetic security solution, since much of the information available through Isuf can also be obtained with tools such as *ps* and *netstat*, although the process may not be quite as convenient. The prebuilt versions in various distributions handle security differently. Debian grants non-administrative users unrestricted use of Isuf, whereas Red Hat Enterprise applies restrictions.




Figure 3: The Java-based JLsof tool converts Isof output to a simple table.

MySQL, PHP). The administrator notices an enormous increase in network load that doesn't reflect the number of page hits. The administrator suspects that an attacker has injected a trojan that copies files over the wire, launches distributed network attacks or sends spam mail. In a LAMP environment, the PHP system interface is one of the major targets, as PHP suffers from a couple of design weaknesses [6], but poorly crafted scripts can just as easily give an attacker a foothold.

If you are familiar with typical PHP attack patterns, you will probably already have guessed what kind of information you need to look for with Isof.

The Apache web server runs under its own user account by default, *www-data* (Debian), *apache*, *httpd*, or if the worst comes to the worst, *nobody* (this account is normally reserved for NFS). Typically, additional processes will run as root to support privileged ports and to

be able to open log files. In contrast to this, data communications are handled by unprivileged processes. Thus, a web server offers a guessable configuration of users, executable files, and open ports. For example, *www-data* runs */usr/sbin/apache2* on Debian.

What's Running Where?

In this context, we need a call to *lsof -a -d txt -u www-data* to list processes that execute the file */usr/sbin/apache2* as the *www-data* user account. The *-a* option gives us a logical AND, *-d txt* lists executed files only, and *-u www-data* restricts the output to just one user. Under normal circumstances, this will give you just the Apache processes.

If an attacker manages to manipulate PHP or your PHP scripts and execute system commands and programs on the server, these commands and processes will typically run under the same account as Apache – that is, unless the attacker has escalated his privileges and gained root access by exploiting other security holes.

Finding processes that belong to the Apache user and that also access other binaries or open unexpected ports, should set off the alarms. *lsof -p PID*

investigates the suspicious processes for details of network connections, libraries that have been loaded, open files, and many other things.

As malevolent hackers tend to use their own FTP, IRC, telnet, or SSH servers, initial analysis should include searching for open ports. The *lsof -a -i -u www-data | grep LISTEN* command lists all the IP sockets (*-i*), which sockets the Apache user has opened, (*-u www-data*), and which are listening for connections (this explains *grep LISTEN*).

Everything apart from 80 (HTTP) and 443 (HTTPS) is suspicious. Although a call to *netstat* will give you similar results, Isof can help you perform more detailed analysis without needing to switch to another tool.

The Real World

Apache and PHP exploits are fairly common. Listings 2a and 2b show two excerpts from the Isof logs on compromised servers, and they are all I need to diagnose an attack. The output results from analyzing processes belonging to the *www-data* account. See Listing 3 for another abridged example.

In the first example, the attacker exploits an obsolete version of W-Agora (online forum software) and a directory without write protection (Listing 2a, Line 2: */home/user/public_html/w-agera/*).

Table 1: Isof Examples

Command	Explanation
<i>lsof</i>	Without any parameters, the command gives you an overview.
<i>lsof /bin/bash</i>	Lists all processes that use bash.
<i>lsof -p PID</i>	Lists the open files for the process with the specified process ID.
<i>lsof +D /tmp</i>	Lists all open files in <i>/tmp</i> and its subdirectories without symbolic links.
<i>lsof -u Benutzer</i>	Lists all open files for the specified user.
<i>lsof -u ^root</i>	Lists all open files, except for those opened by root.
<i>lsof -d txt</i>	Displays a process list, similar to <i>ps aux</i> , by listing entries with the file descriptor entry <i>txt</i> , instead of the normal number (<i>txt</i> refers to program code and data, that is, for executed files).
<i>lsof +L1</i>	Displays all deleted files that are still open, and thus still occupy disk space, but are not part of any directory (files with less than one link).
<i>lsof -i</i>	Network-related files.
<i>lsof -i -P -n</i>	All network-related files without the port number as a service identifier, and without resolving hostnames (for faster response).
<i>lsof -i6</i>	Shows IPv6-related files.
<i>lsof -i grep ^->'</i>	All active connections.
<i>lsof -a -i -u www-data</i>	All open network files for the <i>www-data</i> account (AND relation <i>-a</i>).

Listing 2a: Bash Camouflage

01	COMMAND	PID	USER	FD	TYPE	DEVICE	SIZE	NODE	NAME
02	bash	30334	www-data	cwd	DIR	3,8	4096	1571340	/home/user/public_html/w-agera/.m
03	bash	30334	www-data	txt	REG	3,8	496231	1571405	/home/user/public_html/w-agera/.m/bash
04	bash	30334	www-data	0w	REG	3,8	125	1571408	/home/user/public_html/w-agera/.m/LinkEvents
05	bash	30334	www-data	2u	IPv4	4709341			server.com:40001->undernet.xs4all.nl:ircd ESTABLISHED)

The attacker has created a new directory *.m* to use as a working directory (Line 2, Column FD: Current Working Directory). The attacker has uploaded C files to the directory and then compiled and executed the files using a harmless-sounding account name of *bash*.

However, as you can see in Line 5, the programs are not as harmless as the name might suggest; this *bash* has an open connection to an IRC server. Plus, *bash* has written data to the *LinkEvents* file, which is obvious from the file descriptor *0w* (that is, *bash* has opened stdout for writing).

Cheeky but Dumb

Our cyber criminal is really cheeky, but the attacker's methods reveal more self-confidence than technical ability – especially considering the fact that he has not bothered to cover his tracks. Hiding the directory by starting the directory with a dot and using *bash* as the account name for the processes, are both beginner's tricks.

In the second example (Listing 2b), the attacker has found a similar security hole and installed several applications. Again, the attacker has not taken the trouble to cover up; the *www-data* ac-

count has a number of open ports, including on the *Psybnc* IRC proxy. The unique process name of *psybnc* (Lines 5 through 8) is a real give-away, but at least there is an attempt to hide the processes behind a familiar name – as the name server *bind* in Line 9.

In fact, this is a patched SSH server that grants system access to *www-data* without requiring a password. There also is a server process with the suspicious name of *a* (see Lines 2 through 4).

Automatation

You may have the need for a script that compares a known system status with the current status and responds in a predefined way in case of deviations – that is, an anomaly detection system. With




Figure 4: Sloth provides a native Isof interface for Mac OS X.

Isof, it makes sense to monitor a list of open ports, adding process names, user-names, and interfaces.

The command shown in Line 1 of Listing 3 handles the first part of this task in

GUI Tools

GUI fans may find it hard to locate a graphical front-end for Isof. The Libgnome-based *glsof* tool [3] is fairly new, and its developers are still extremely busy, although they have not made it past the alpha stage thus far. The release cycles are fairly short, so you might like to download the latest version from the Subversion repository. This actually turned out to be the only way to get things working in our lab. The *glsof* homepage has the usual howtos, and the developers will answer your email if you get stuck.

Glsof gives users the ability to set filters by pointing and clicking (Figure 1) and to store the settings so that they can run the same queries later. Filters support fairly complex rulesets, which you can view and analyze in the query debugging window. Thus, *glsof* considerably shortens the learning curve for Isof newcomers. The ability to set up file monitors in *glsof*, to watch freely definable resources, and to notify administrators in case of access is also useful. Under the hood, all *glsof* does is repeatedly call Isof, which lists access for the point in

time when it was called. As this approach is not event-based, *glsof* can easily overlook short-term access.

The fairly ancient Java front-end, *JLsof* [4], which has not been updated since 2003, has less in the way of functionality than *glsof*, but it also has fewer dependencies. To install *JLsof*, you need to download and unpack the archive. You may need to modify the path to the Java interpreter and to *Isof* in the *jlsof* start script. *JLsof* has a far more spartan look than *glsof*, but it does show you how your filter settings resolve to Isof command line parameters (Figure 2), which is a good thing if you are trying to understand the filter rules. Although you can't actually store filters, *JLsof* will export the output (Figure 3) to an XML document.

If you use a Mac, there is no need to do without a native Isof GUI. *Sloth* [5], which was written in Objective C, scores with a nicely organized interface (Figure 4) that offers predefined filters categorized by resource type and the ability to terminate processes by clicking with the mouse (*kill*).

Listing 2b: Injecting an IRC Proxy

```
01 COMMAND  PID  USER  FD
   TYPE    DEVICE SIZE NODE NAME
02 a        10555 www-data 266u
   IPv4    2808      TCP *:
   https (LISTEN)
03 a        10555 www-data 267u
   IPv4    2809      TCP *:www
   (LISTEN)
04 a        10555 www-data 543u
   IPv4  757852768      TCP
   *:9713 (LISTEN)
05 psybnc  10615 www-data 266u
   IPv4    2808      TCP *:
   https (LISTEN)
06 psybnc  10615 www-data 267u
   IPv4    2809      TCP *:www
   (LISTEN)
07 psybnc  10615 www-data 543u
   IPv4  757871322      TCP *:
   ircd (LISTEN)
08 psybnc  10615 www-data 549u
   IPv4  762054917      TCP
   server.com:35614->oslo1.
   no.eu.undernet.org:ircd
   (ESTABLISHED)
09 bind    22004 www-data 543u
   IPv4  696149859      TCP
   *:1982 (LISTEN)
```

Listing 3: Open TCP Ports

```

01 $ lsof -i TCP -n -P | awk '/
    LISTEN/ {print $1/"$3/"$8}'
    | sort -u
02 apache/root/*:443
03 apache/root/*:80
04 apache/www-data/*:443
05 apache/www-data/*:80
06 mysqld/mysqld/127.0.0.1:3306
07 sshd/root/*:22

```

an elegant way. It tells *lsof* to output network-related files (*-i*) without writing out the port numbers as service names (*-P*) and without resolving IP addresses to hostnames (*-n*). *Awk* checks the output for listening ports (*LISTEN* status) and formats the output as: *username/processname/IP:Port*, where an IP address of *** stands for a server that listens to all interfaces.

The final *sort* organizes the output in alphabetical order, and *-u* ensures that each combination of user, process, and service occurs only once.

The output shown in Line 2 of Listing 3 was taken from a Debian Sarge server with Apache 1.3, MySQL, and an SSH daemon. In our example, MySQL only binds to the local interface (Line 6), while Apache and SSH are accessible via any interface.

The grouping of the Apache processes in *root* and *www-data*, which results from dropping root privileges after

launching the program, is characteristic for the web server.

Do-It-Yourself IDS

The miniature *lsof*-based IDS in Listing 3 works as depicted in Figure 5. When launched, the script remembers (Listing 4, Lines 4 through 8) the current port configuration. Every 10 seconds, it calls *lsof* to fetch the list of open ports and compares the list with the last known status (Line 12). If a change occurs, the script mails the before/after status (Lines 14 through 0) and uses the new status for further comparisons (Line 22).

To test your do-it-yourself anomaly detection system, you might like to temporarily open a port. Netcat offers an easy way to do so. Give a command like *nc -l -p 12345* to launch Netcat in *LISTEN* mode (*-l*) and keep port 12345 open. Within 10 seconds, the shell script in the infinite loop should have noticed the status change and responded accordingly.

Be aware that some processes change *lsof*'s view of the port assignments. For example, some email servers fork additional processes, depending on the status of the incoming connection. Under




Figure 5: The script shown in Listing 4 alerts the administrator whenever a change occurs in the port assignments. To do so, it compares the original status with the current status every 10 seconds.

certain circumstances, processes like this can cause false alerts, although it's fairly easy to avoid by modifying the logic behind the query. Adding *| grep -v temporary service* in Line 5 should do the trick.

Conclusion

A simple shell script can't hope to replace a full-fledged IDS, but if you're looking for a no-frills detection tool or an extra line of defense, *lsof* could be a part of the solution. Useful additions might be cryptography-based configuration management in the style of *Aide*, checks on executed files, evaluation of the UDP configuration, and many other things. Repeated calls to *lsof* can also open up new fields of application, as evidenced by the file monitor options in *Glsf*. Whether you script with *lsof* or use it as a fast, universal administration tool, *lsof* is an easy, if limited, tool for spotting intruders. ■

Listing 4: Port Monitoring

```

01 #!/bin/bash
02 MAILTO="root"
03 HOSTNAME=`hostname`
04 getports() {
05     lsof -i -n -P | awk '/LISTEN/
    {print $1/"$3/"$8}' | sort
    -u
06 }
07
08 OLD=$(getports)
09 echo -e "Start with following
    port assignments:\n$OLD"
10 while sleep 10 ; do
11     NEW=$(getports)
12     if test "$OLD" != "$NEW" ;
13         echo "Port assignments
    changed! Notify administrator
    by email"
14     mail -s "Attention:
    $HOSTNAME LISTEN status
    changed" $MAILTO <<EOF
15 Status prior to change:
16 $OLD
17
18 Status after change:
19 $NEW
20 EOF
21 fi
22 OLD="$NEW"
23 done

```

INFO

- [1] *lsof* homepage on Freshmeat: <http://freshmeat.net/projects/lsof/>
- [2] *lsof* FAQ: <ftp://lsof.itap.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/lsof/FAQ>
- [3] *Glsf*: <http://glsof.sourceforge.net>
- [4] *Jlsof*: <http://www.geocities.co.jp/SiliconValley/1596/jlsof/readme.html>
- [5] *Sloth*: <http://www.sveinbjorn.org/sloth/>
- [6] Hardened PHP: <http://www.hardened-php.net>